Practice in Christianity : Kierkegaard's Writings, Vol 20,

Practice in Christianity is dominated by Kierkegaard's critique of Christendom, and his vexation with the Established Church of Denmark. Kierkegaard laments that "all a Christians in Christendom" and there is no understanding of suffering or offense because everyone in the country has been Christianized and baptized as Christians regardless of individual experience. In Theology, those Christians who have died are considered to be part of the "Church Triumphant" and Christians still living and awaiting the second coming of Christ on Earth are described as the "Church Militant." Kierkegaard complains that Christendom has turned the Church Militant into the Church Triumphant, and has commandeered the Eternal Heavenly state without it being realized. This is a major theme throughout Practice in Theology, and it is analogous to Dietrich Bonhoeffer's "Cheap Grace" vs. "Costly Grace" taxonomy.

In response to Christendom, Kierkegaard develops a theology of offense and a way of suffering for Christians. Kierkegaard coins the term "Religious Narcissism" to describe Christians who see God as a divine source of help in their fight against the Devil. Kierkegaard laments that Religious Narcissism excludes the chastening that a Father must give to their children, and that the discipline of a Child is what identifies that Child with its Father. I read David J. Gouwen's "Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker" before Practice in Theology as a study aid to Kierkegaard. Gouwen's book was helpful as an overview of the philosophical and theological writings of Kierkegaard's complete works; and although it was not as helpful as Walter Lowrie's biography, A Short Life of Kierkegaard, in terms of understanding Kierkegaard, the Gouwen's book highlighted several selections by Kierkegaard. The following quotation helps understand Kierkegaard's understanding of Luther's Theology of the Cross, in a discussion about images that are familiar to children. Most images of people like Napoleon are glamorous figures on a high horse with feather capped uniforms and valiant posses, and how the images of the crucifixion are so entirely foreign to Children: 

The Face of Christ, Detail from the Crucifixion from the Isenheim Altarpiece, circa 1512-16

"[...] this picture, and will ask what it means, why he hangs like that on a tree. So you explain to the child that this is a cross, and that to hang on it means to be crucified, and that in that land crucifixion was not only the most painful death penalty but was also an ignominious mode of execution employed only for the grossest malefactors. What impression will that make upon the child? The child will be in a strange state of mind, it will surely wonder that it could occur to you to put such an ugly picture among all the other lovely ones, the picture of a gross malefactor among all these heroes and glorious figures. For just as a reproach to the Jews there was written above His cross, "The King of the Jews," so this picture, which regularly is published every year as a reproach to the human race, is a remembrance which the race never can and never should be rid of, it never should be represented differently; and it will seem as if it were this generation which crucified Him, as often as this generation for the first times shows this picture to the child of the new generation, explaining for the first time it hears this, will become anxious and sorrowful, for his parents, for the world, and for himself; and the other pictures--surely (as the ballad relates) they must turn their faces away, this picture being so different.  However--and we have not yet reached the decisive point, the child has not learned who this gross malefactor was--with the curiosity children always have, the child will no doubt ask, "Who is it, what did he do? Tell me." Then tell the child that this crucified man is the Savior of the world. Yet to this he will not be able to attach any clear conceptions; so tell him merely that this crucified man was the most loving person that ever lived. Oh, in common intercourse, where everyone knows that story by rote as familiar patter, in common intercourse, where a half-word thrown out as a hint is enough to apprise everyone what is meant--there it goes so glibly; but verily it must be a wonderful man, or rather an inhuman one, who does not instinctively cast down his eyes and stand almost like a poor sinner the moment he must tell this to a child for the first time, to a child who has never heard a word about it before, and consequently has never surmised such a thing. But then at that moment the parent stands as an accuser, who accuses himself and the whole race!--What impression now do you think it will make upon the child, who naturally will ask, "But why were people so bad to him then?"

-- pg160, Søren Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity, (trans. Walter Lowrie).

Kierkegaard used many pseudonyms for his works, the names represent his disposition and the character of the work, but also may have served to provide Kierkegaard anonymity while he was at the theater (to keep gossip from getting out of hand.) Some of the more well known pseudonyms are: Judge Williams, Constantin Constantius, Johannes Climacus and Anti-Climacus. Kierkegaard separated Philosophy from Theology, and earlier in life he favored the prior, but late in life he reversed this order of separation by putting Theology before Philosophy. According to the biography I'm reading, this Johannes Climacus was an atheist, and Kierkegaard's alteration of the name and character to Anti-Climacus represented this shift from Philosophy to Theology. Two of Kierkegaard's greatest theological works were written under the pseudonym Anti-Climacus: Sickness Unto Death and Practice in Theology (also titled Training in Theology).

I'm reading a series of books on and by Kierkegaard that were recommend by scholarly friend of mine. The above mentioned biography is A Short Life of Kierkegaard by Walter Lowrie. The work is an abridgement of a larger biography by the same author, and it is reduced to the events of Kierkegaard's life at home and away with only brief explanation of his books or thought. The book helps put Kierkegaard in perspective by explaining his broken relationship with his wealthy father, the deaths of most of his siblings and also his broken engagement with Regina. The biography tells a story of a man trapped by sin and despair, not of a man of exemplary Christian living. It's only after his inheritance runs out that Kierkegaard at last turns to Theology and begins to climb out of his life long Despair. Particularly after he lives past the age of 34, which he did not believe possible. He also believed that 34 was the maximum life span he would obtain, and squandered his fortune intentionally before this age of 34. 

 I'm reading A Short Life of Kierkegaard immediately after reading Sickness Unto Death. Kierkegaard's dialectical explaination of Despair in Sickness Unto Death is what has drawn me to read his works. Kierkegaard was initially attached to Schelling's criticism of Hegel, but only after hearing Schelling, did Kierkegaard abandon Schelling to derive his ownership of dialectic thought. My scholarly friend suggested that Kierkegaard's Either/Or could be fairly titled Either/Or/Or. In Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard describes Despair as the desire of riding oneself of oneself and being unable to do so. He uses the example of a man who desire to be Caesar, and describes his despair as not the failing to be Caesar but the hatred of being a person unable to be Caesar, because the failure to be Caesar is something that cannot be lived with for that despairing person. The discussion of Despair as negation is very helpful, and Kierkegaard identifies Despair with Sin in that book, and say many interesting things such as a person who is aware of their Despair is capable of being cured from their sickness, but a person in Despair will be unaware of their sickness until they recover. 

I'm planning to read Practice in Theology soon, and hopefully another book analyzing Kierkegaard's Thought.  Paul Tillich said that Karl Barth did not include Kierkegaard in his 19th Protestant Theology because Tillich believed Kierkegaard should be classified among the 20th century or later authors. 

In conclusion, I found it interesting in A Short Life of Kierkegaard that Lowrie writes that Kierkegaard was dismissed as a Catholic and a Humanist by Karl Barth (and his followers). I look forward to learn more from my scholarly friend how Barth and Kierkegaard relate.

"But in addition to this concise positive orientation, a negative orientation may be even more necessary, i.e. a warning against what Professor Hirsch calls "the well worn paths of German misinterpretation." When Karl Barth jettisoned S.K. with the declaration that essentially he was a Catholic, he implicitly acknowledged that he had misinterpreted him in the first instance. But Barth's followers still misinterpret S.K. when they pretend to derive from him their doctrine which posits an irreconcilable opposition between the religion of transcendence ("the infinite yawning qualitative difference between God and man," to use S.K.'s phrase which defines "religiousness B" of the Postscript), and the religion of immediacy ("religiousness A") -- as though this was the either/or proposed by S.K."

-- page 173. Walter Lowrie, A Short Life of Kierkegaard

Edwards wrote a series of short books that he hoped to overturn the Half-Way Covenant's universal acceptance among New England Congregational Churches. Edwards acknowledged that he at first acquiesced to the Half-Way Covenant but later came to the conviction that it was not biblical sound. His congregation used this confession against him when he was removed from his North Hampton Church. There are three particular books on the Communion Controversy by Edwards that are contained in Yale's Works of Jonathan Edwards, Ecclesiastical Writings (WJE Online Vol. 12) , Ed. David D. Hall, that are most relevant to the Half-Way Covenant and this controversy: An Humble Inquiry into the Rules of the Word of God, Concerning the Qualifications Requisite to a Complete Standing and Full Communion in the Visible Christian Church, Misrepresentations Corrected, and Truth Vindicated, and Narrative of Communion Controversy. (The titles may be abbreviated referred to An Humble Inquiry, Misrepresentations Corrected and Narrative respectively.)

The core point of rejection the Half-Way Covenant was that it did not require a person to be converted, born again, regenerated, but only acknowledge the Church's Dogma. Here is an extended quotation from An Humble Inquiry Part II Section 11, where Edwards explains what it means that a man should examine himself before he eats the Lord's Supper. This discussion is particular important today due to the popularity of Federal Vision and padeocommunion which are remarkably similar to the Half-Way Covenant. 

11. When the Apostle says, 1 Corinthians 11:28, "Let a man examine himself, and so let him eat…," it seems to be much the most reasonable to understand it of trying himself with regard to the truth of his Christianity, or reality of his grace; the same which the same Apostle directs the same Corinthians to, in his other epistle 2 Corinthians 13:5, where the same word is used in the original. The Greek word (δοϰιμαζέτω) will not allow of what some have supposed to be the Apostle's meaning, viz. that a man should consider and inquire into his circumstances, and the necessities of his case, that he may know what are the wants he should go to the Lord's Table for a supply of. The word properly signifies "proving" or "trying" a thing with respect to its quality and goodness, or in order to determine whether it be true and of the right sort. And so the word is always used in the New Testament; unless that sometimes 'tis used as it were metonymically, and in such places is variously [-- 259 --] translated, either "discerning," or "allowing," "approving," "liking," etc. these being the effects of trial. Nor is the word used more frequently in the New Testament for any sort of trial whatever, than for the trial of professors with regard to their grace or piety. The word (as Dr. Ames, in his Catecheséòs Sciagraphia,5 and Mr. Willard in his Body of Divinity,6 observe) is borrowed from goldsmiths, properly signifying the trial they make of their silver and gold, whether it be genuine or counterfeit: and with a manifest allusion to this original application of the word, is often used in the New Testament for a trying the piety of professors. 'Tis used with this view in all the following texts. 1 Peter 1:7, "That the trial of your faith, being much more precious than of gold that perisheth, though it be tried by fire, might be found unto praise," etc. 1 Corinthians 3:13, "The fire shall try every man's work of what sort it is." James 1:3, "The trying of your faith worketh patience." 1 Thessalonians 2:4, "God who trieth our hearts." The same word is used in 2 Corinthians 8:8, "To prove the sincerity of your love." So, Galatians 6:3-4, "If any man thinketh himself to be something, when he is nothing, he deceiveth himself: but let every man prove his own work." In all these places there's the same word in the Greek with that in the text now under consideration.

When the Apostle directs professing Christians to "try" themselves, using this word indefinitely, as properly signifying the examining or proving a thing whether it be genuine, or counterfeit, the most natural construction of his advice is, that they should try themselves with respect to their spiritual state and religious profession, whether they are disciples indeed, real and genuine Christians, or whether they are not false and hypocritical professors. As if a man should bring a piece of metal that had the color of gold, with the impress of the king's coin, to a goldsmith, and desire him to try that money, without adding any words to limit his meaning, would not the goldsmith naturally understand, that he was to try whether it was true gold, or true money, yea or no?

But here it is said by some, that the context of the passage under [-- 260 --] debate (1 Corinthians 11:28) does plainly limit the meaning of the word in that place; the Apostle there speaking of those things that had appeared among the communicants at Corinth, which were of a scandalous nature, so doubtless unfitting 'em for the Lord's Supper; and therefore when the Apostle directs 'em to examine or prove themselves, 'tis but just, to suppose his meaning to be, that they should try whether they ben't disqualified by scandal. To this I answer, though the Apostle's putting the Corinthians upon trying themselves, was on occasion of the mentioning some scandalous practices found among them, yet this is by no means any argument of its being only his meaning, that they should try themselves whether they were scandalous persons; and not, that they should try whether they were true genuine Christians. The very nature of scandal (as was observed before) is, that which tends to obscure the visibility of the piety of professors, and wound others' charity towards them, by bringing the reality of their grace into doubt; and therefore what could be more natural, than for the Apostle, when mentioning such scandals among the Corinthians, to put them upon trying the state of their souls, and proving their sincerity? This is certainly the case in this Apostle's directing the same persons to prove themselves (2 Corinthians 13:5), using the same word there, which he uses here, and giving his direction on the like occasion. For in the second epistle (as well as in the first) his putting them on examining and proving themselves, was on occasion of his mentioning some scandals found among them; as is plain from the foregoing context. And yet there it is expressly said, that the thing concerning which he directs them to prove themselves, is, whether they be "in the faith," and whether Christ is in them. Nor is there anything more in the preceding context of one place, than in that of the other, obliging or leading us to understand the Apostle to intend only a trying whether they were scandalous, and not whether they were sincere Christians.

And as to the words following in the next verse, "For he that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment to himself, not discerning the Lord's body": these words, by no means, make it evident (as some hold) that what the Apostle would have them examine themselves about, is, whether they have doctrinal knowledge, sufficient to understand, that the bread and wine in the sacrament signify the body and blood of Christ: but on the contrary, to interpret the Apostle in this sense only, is unreasonable, upon several accounts. (1) None can so much as go about such an examination, without first knowing, that the Lord's body and blood is signified by these elements. [-- 261 --]  For merely a man's putting this question to himself, Do I understand that this bread and this wine signify the body and blood of Christ? supposes him already to know it from a previous information; and therefore to exhort persons to go about such an examination, would be absurd. And then (2) 'tis incredible that there should be any such gross ignorance appearing in a number of the communicants in the Corinthian church, if we consider what the Scripture informs us concerning that church: as particularly, if we consider what an able and thorough instructor and spiritual father they had had, even the apostle Paul, who founded that church, brought them out of their heathenish darkness, and initiated them in the Christian religion, and had instructed them in the nature and ends of gospel ordinances, and continued at Corinth, constantly laboring in the word and doctrine for a long while together, no less than a year and six months; and, as we may well suppose, administering the Lord's Supper among them every Lord's day; for the Apostle speaks of it as the manner of that church to communicate at the Lord's Table with such frequency (1 Corinthians 16:2). And the Corinthian church at that day when the Apostle wrote this epistle, was a church noted for excelling in doctrinal knowledge; as is evident by ch. 1 Corinthians 1:5-7 and several other passages in the epistle. Besides, the communicants were expressly told at every communion, every week, when the bread and wine were delivered to them in the administration, that that bread signified the body, and that wine signified the blood of Christ. And then besides, (3) the Apostle by his argument in ch. 1 Corinthians 10:16 supposes the Corinthians doctrinally acquainted with this subject already. It therefore appears to me much more reasonable, to apprehend the case to be thus: the offensive behavior of the communicants at Corinth gave the Apostle reason to suspect, that some of them came to the Lord's Table without a proper impression and true sense of the great and glorious things there signified; having no habitual hunger or relish for the spiritual food there represented, no inward vital and experimental taste of that flesh of the Son of Man, which is meat indeed. The word translated "discerning," signifies to "discriminate" or "distinguish." The taste is the proper sense whereby to discern or distinguish food (Job 34:3). And 'tis a spiritual sense or taste which is that whereby we discern or distinguish spiritual food. Hebrews 5:14, "Those who by reason of use, have their senses exercised to discern both good and evil," Πϱος διάϱισιν, etc. a word of the same root with that rendered "discerning," in 1 Corinthians 11:29. He that has no habitual appetite to and relish of that spiritual food, which is represented [-- 262 --] and offered at the Lord's Table; he that has no spiritual taste wherewith to perceive anything more at the Lord's Supper, than common food; or that has no higher view, than with a little seeming devotion to eat bread, as it were in the way of an ordinance, but without regarding in his heart the spiritual meaning and end of it and without being at all suitably affected with the dying love of Christ therein commemorated; such a one may most truly and properly be said not to discern the Lord's body. When therefore the Apostle exhorts to self-examination as a preparative for the sacramental supper he may well be understood to put professors upon inquiring whether they have such a principle of faith, by means whereof they are habitually in a capacity and disposition of mind to discern the Lord's body practically and spiritually (as well as speculatively and notionally) in their communicating at the Lord's Table: which is what none can do who have but common grace, or a faith short of that which is justifying and saving. It's only a living faith that capacitates men to discern the Lord's body in the sacrament with that spiritual sensation or spiritual gust, which is suitable to the nature and design of the ordinance, and which the Apostle seems principally to intend.

-- Jonathan Edwards [1737], An Humble Inquiry into the Rules of the Word of God, Concerning the Qualifications Requisite to a Complete Standing and Full Communion in the Visible Christian Church, Ecclesiastical Writings (WJE Online Vol. 12) , Ed. David D. Hall, pages 258-262

Although Edwards lost the battle in his day, due to numerous objects, his writings lead to the future demise of the Half-Way Covenant. Unfortunately, Edwards did not live to see his writings vindicated. The value of these writings in Ecclesiastical Writings (WJE Online Vol. 12) is that they do not collapse into a Independentist, Separatist or Baptist position that ushers the Church out of public life into private quarters, especially in regards to Edward's approval of Infant Baptism (padeobaptism.) Edwards remains faithful to Covenantal Reformed Theology, but also understands the necessity of conversion, and this is most clear in his explanation of the underlying Greek word for "examining oneself". 

Works of Jonathan Edwards (WJE Online)

Volume 16, Section 32. TO DEBORAH HATHEWAY

INTRODUCTION:

The town of Suffield, Massachusetts,1 had experienced revivals in 1734 and, later, as a result of Whitefield's visit in 1740 and a visit from Edwards in early 1741, before the famous preaching of Sinners.2 So it was natural for Deborah Hatheway, an eighteen-year-old convert who was without a pastor,3 to turn to a known, trusted adviser for counsel. Responding to her inquiry, Edwards wrote this guide for a young Christian, with emphasis upon attitude and behavior.

Conspicuously absent from this letter are minatory rhetoric and theological complexities. Instead, a serene tone pervades. Lay exhortation is permitted on a private level; initiative and responsibility are stressed, as long as they accompany absolute reliance on direct divine assistance. In this, Edwards echoes the Shema, Psalms, and New Testament.

(The location of the original ms. is unknown. In addition to early printed copies, there is a ms. copy in an unknown hand, probably eighteenth century, in the Beinecke Library, which is followed here; and a Dwight ms. copy in the Trask Library. The letter, often reprinted, has become a classic of Christian

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devotion. Publication began in 1807 under the title Advice to Young Converts; beginning in 1827, the letter was widely distributed by the American Tract Society. By 1875, at least 328,000 copies had been issued. See Thomas H. Johnson, The Printed Writings of Jonathan Edwards, 1703—1758, A Bibliography [Princeton, 1940], pp. 99—101.)

LETTER:

∗ ∗ ∗

Northampton, June 3, 1741

 

Dear Child,

As you desired me to send you in writing some directions, how to conduct yourself in your Christian course, I would now answer your request. The sweet remembrance of the great things I have lately seen at Suffield, and the dear affections for those persons I have there conversed with, that give good evidences of a saving work of God upon their hearts, inclines me to do anything that lies in my power, to contribute to the spiritual joy and prosperity of God's people there. And what I write to you, I would also say to other young women there, that are your friends and companions and the children of God; and therefore desire you would communicate it to them as you have opportunity.

I would advise you to keep up as great a strife and earnestness in religion in all parts of it, as you would do if you knew yourself to be in a state of nature and was seeking conversion. We advise persons under convictions to be earnest and violent for the kingdom of heaven, but when they have attained to conversion they ought not to be the less watchful, laborious and earnest in the whole work of religion, but the more; for they are under infinitely greater obligations. For want of this, many persons in a few months after their conversion have begun to lose the sweet and lively sense of spiritual things, and to grow cold and Hat and dark, and have pierced themselves through with many sorrows, whereas if they had done as the Apostle did, Philippians 3:12-14, their path would have been as the shining light, that shines more and more unto the perfect day.Don't leave off seeking, striving and praying for the very same things that we exhort unconverted persons to strive for, and a degree of which you have had in conversion. Thus pray that your eyes may be opened, that you may receive your sight, that you may know your self, and be brought to God's foot, and that you may see the glory of God

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and Christ and may be raised from the dead, and have the love of Christ shed abroad in your heart; for those that have most of these things, had need still to pray for them; for there is so much blindness and hardness and pride and death remaining, that they still need to have that work of God wrought upon them, further to enlighten and enliven them; that shall be a bringing out of darkness into God's marvelous light, and a kind of new conversion and resurrection from the dead. There are very few requests that are proper for a natural person, but that in some sense are proper for the godly.

When you hear sermons hear 'em for yourself: though what is spoken in them may be more especially directed to the unconverted, or to those that in other respects are in different circumstances from yourself. Yet let the chief intent of your mind be to consider with yourself, in what respects is this that I hear spoken, applicable to me, and what improvement ought I to make of this for my own soul's good? Though God has forgiven and forgotten your past sins, yet don't forget 'em yourself: often remember what a wretched bond slave you was in the land of Egypt. Often bring to mind your particular acts of sin before conversion, as the blessed apostle Paul is often mentioning his old blaspheming, persecuting and injuriousness, to the renewed humbling of his heart and acknowledging that he was the least of the apostles, and not worthy to be called an apostle, and the least of all saints, and the chief of sinners. And be often in confessing your old sins to God, and let that text be often in your mind, Ezekiel 16:63, "That thou mayest remember and be confounded, and never open thy mouth any more because of thy shame, when I am pacified toward thee for all that thou hast done, saith the Lord God."Remember that you have more cause, on some accounts a thousand times, to lament and humble yourself for sins that have been since conversion than before, because of the infinitely greater obligations that are upon you to live to God. And look upon the faithfulness of Christ in unchangeably continuing his loving favor, and the unspeakable and saving fruits of his everlasting love, notwithstanding all your great unworthiness since your conversion, to be as great or wonderful, as his grace in converting you.Be always greatly abased for your remaining sin, and never think that you lie low enough for it, but yet don't be at all discouraged or disheartened by it; for though we are exceeding sinful, yet we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous, the preciousness of whose blood, and the merit of whose righteousness and the greatness 

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of whose love and faithfulness does infinitely overtop the highest mountains of our sins.

When you engage in the duty of prayer, or come to the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, or attend any other duty of divine worship, come to Christ as Mary Magdalene did, Luke 7:37-38. Come and cast yourself down at his feet and kiss 'em, and pour forth upon him the sweet perfumed ointment of divine love, out of a pure and broken heart, as she poured her precious ointment out of her pure, alabaster, broken box.Remember that pride is the worst viper that is in the heart, the greatest disturber of the soul's peace and sweet communion with Christ; it was the first sin that ever was, and lies lowest in the foundation of Satan's whole building, and is the most difficultly rooted out, and is the most hidden, secret and deceitful of all lusts, and often creeps in, insensibly, into the midst of religion and sometimes under the disguise of humility.That you may pass a good judgment of the frames you are in, always look upon those the best discourses and the best comforts that have most of these two effects, viz. those that make you least, lowest, and most like a little child; and secondly, those that do most engage and fix your heart in a full and firm disposition to deny yourself for God, and to spend and be spent for him.If at any time you fall into doubts about the state of your soul under darkness and dull frames of mind, 'tis proper to look over past experiences, but yet don't consume too much of your time and strength in poring and puzzling thoughts about old experiences, that in dull frames appear dim and are very much out of sight, at least as to that which is the cream and life and sweetness of them: but rather apply yourself with all your might, to do an earnest pursuit after renewed experiences, new light, and new, lively acts of faith and love. One new discovery of the glory of Christ's face, and the fountain of his sweet grace and love will do more towards scattering clouds of darkness and doubting in one minute, than examining old experiences by the best mark that can be given, a whole year.When the exercise of grace is at a low ebb, and corruption prevails, and by that means fear prevails, don't desire to have fear cast out any other way, than by the reviving and prevailing of love, for 'tis not agreeable to the method of God's wise dispensations that it should be cast out any other way; for when love is asleep, the saints need fear to restrain them from sin and therefore it is so ordered that at such times

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fear comes upon them, and that more or less as love sinks. But when love is in lively exercise, persons don't need fear, and the prevailing of love in the heart, naturally tends to cast out fear, as darkness in a room vanishes away as you let more and more of the perfect beams of the sun into it, 1 John 4:18.

You ought to be much in exhorting and counseling and warning others, especially at such a day as this, Hebrews 10:25. And I would advise you especially, to be much in exhorting children and young women your equals; and when you exhort others that are men, I would advise that you take opportunities for it, chiefly when you are alone with them, or when only young persons are present. See 1 Timothy 2:9, 1 Timothy 2:11-12.When you counsel and warn others, do it earnestly, affectionately and thoroughly. And when you are speaking to your equals, let your warnings be intermixed with expressions of your sense of your own unworthiness, and of the sovereign grace that makes you differ; and if you can with a good conscience, say how that you in yourself are more unworthy than they.If you would set up religious meetings of young women by yourselves, to be attended once in a while, besides the other meetings that you attend, I should think it would be very proper and profitable.Under special difficulties, or when in great need of or great longings after any particular mercies for your self or others, set apart a day of secret fasting and prayer alone; and let the day be spent not only in petitions for the mercies you desired, but in searching your heart, and looking over your past life, and confessing your sins before God not as is wont to be done in public prayer, but by a very particular rehearsal before God, of the sins of your past life from your childhood hitherto, before and after conversion, with particular circumstances and aggravations, also very particularly and fully as possible, spreading all the abominations of your heart before him.Don't let the adversaries of religion have it to say, that these converts don't carry themselves any better than others. See Matthew 5:47, "What do ye more than others"; how holily should the children of God, and the redeemed and the beloved of the Son of God behave themselves? Therefore walk as a child of the light and of the day and adorn the doctrine of God your Savior; and particularly be much in those things, that may especially be called Christian virtues, and make you like the Lamb of God; be meek and lowly of heart and full of a pure, heavenly and humble love to all; and abound in deeds of love to others,

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and self-denial for others, and let there be in you a disposition to account others better than yourself.

Don't talk of things of religion and matters of experience with an air of lightness and laughter, which is too much the manner in many places.In all your course, walk with God and follow Christ as a little, poor, helpless child, taking hold of Christ's hand, keeping your eye on the mark of the wounds on his hands and side, whence came the blood that cleanses you from sin and hiding your nakedness under the skirt of the white shining robe of his righteousness.Pray much for the church of God and especially that he would carry on his glorious work that he has now begun; and be much in prayer for the ministers of Christ, and particularly I would beg a special interest in your prayers, and the prayers of your Christian companions, both when you are alone and when you are together, for your affectionate friend, that rejoices over you, and desires to be your servant,

 

In Jesus Christ,

 

Jonathan Edwards.

 

1. Suffield was not part of Connecticut until May 1749. Conn. Register and Manual (1962), p. 452. ↩

2. Whitefield, p. 478; Stephen Williams, Diary for Apr. 14, 1741, Storrs Library, Longmeadow, Mass.; JE, Sermon on Luke 19:41 (1741), Beinecke Library. ↩

3. Rev. Ebenezer Devotion, a promoter of the revivals, died Apr. 11, 1741. His successor, Rev. Ebenezer (Jay, was not called until Nov. 5, 1741.↩

 

Jonathan Edwards [1716], Letters and Personal Writings (WJE Online Vol. 16) , Ed. George S. Claghorn [word count] [jec-wjeo16].

Kuyper viewed the resurrection as a restoration of Adam to his pre-Fall (antelapsarianism?) , yet improved and completed in Christ. Kuyper taught that Adam knew God through Natural Revelation in a way that is not possible now due to the Fall. Kuyper also believed that it was necessary for Jesus Christ to be a descendant of Adam, so that he would essentially restore Adam's body to the pre-Fallen state. 

Kuyper on Adam's Knowledge of Himself and the Cosmos:

To make this clear we must go back a moment to the first man, who, in so far as he represented our entire race, was no individual, and in whose case we do not yet need to reckon with the relation in which we stand to other men. It is evident that, when thus taken, Adam possessed in himself, apart from the cosmos, everything that was necessary to have knowledge of God.

Undoubtedly many things concerning God were manifest to him in the cosmos also; without sin a great deal of God would have become manifest to him from his fellow-men; and through the process of his development, in connection with the cosmos, he would have obtained an ever richer revelation of God. But apart from all this acquired knowledge of God, he had in himself the capacity to draw knowledge of God from what had been revealed, as well as a rich revelation from which to draw that knowledge. Our older theologians called these two together the “concreate knowledge of God”; and correctly so, because here there was no logical activity which led to this knowledge of God, but this knowledge of God coincided with man’s own self-knowledge. This knowledge of God was given eo ipso in his own self-consciousness; it was not given as discursive knowledge, but as the immediate content of selfconsciousness. Even in our present degenerate condition, when much of ourselves can only be learned by observation, there is always a background of self-knowledge and of knowledge of our own existence, which is given immediately with our self-consciousness. Before the fall, when no darkening had yet taken place, this immediate self-knowledge must have been much more potent and clear. And thus it could not be otherwise but that in this clear and 187 immediate self-knowledge there was, without any further action of the logos in us, an equally immediate knowledge of God, the consciousness of which, from that very image itself, accompanied him who had been created in the image of God. Thus the first man lived in an innate knowledge of God, which was not yet understood, and much less expressed in words, just as our human heart in its first unfoldings has a knowledge of ideals, which, however, we are unable to explain or give a form to. Calvin called this the seed of religion (semen religionis), by which he indicated that this innate knowledge of God is an ineradicable property of human nature, a spiritual eye in us, the lens of which may be dimmed, but always so that the lens, and consequently the eye, remains.

pg 186-187, Abraham Kuyper, Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology

Kuyper on Adam's Knowledge of God derived from Nature before the Fall. (Kuyper seems to believe that Knowledge of God evident in Nature before the Fall but not after). 

Hence this logical action also was included in innate theology; simply because otherwise it could have been no theology. This, however, should not be taken in the sense that Adam was created with some sort of a catechism in his head; for logical action presumes subjective action of the human mind. If, therefore, we should speak with entire accuracy, we should say that there was no increated theology in Adam, but that he was so created, that, in his awakening to selfconsciousness, he arrived of necessity at this original theology from the data that were present in him. In a literal sense respiration was not increated in Adam, for the first inhalation only came when the creation was completed, while before the creation was ended he could not draw breath. Breathing is an action of the person which comes only when the person exists. Since all the conditions for breathing are given in our nature, and every person born in this nature breathes of himself and from necessity, no one hesitates to acknowledge that respiration is inborn with us all. It were mere prudery, therefore, to object to the expression of innate or concreate theology; for though theology is the result of a logical action in the subject, with Adam this logical action took place immediately and from necessity; and it was by this alone that the receiving of an oral revelation was already possible in paradise. For it is plain that the entire representation which the Scripture gives us of the intercourse with God in paradise, of the fall and subsequent promise, becomes unintelligible and falls [190] away, if we assume in Adam exclusively the sense of the eternal, and deny him all conscious knowledge of God.

pg 189-190, Abraham Kuyper, Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology

Kuyper on the Regenerated Adam. (Kuyper believed that the Second Adam [Jesus] resurrected boy is a restoration of the original body of Adam.)

Meanwhile this qualification of regenerated humanity demands a fuller explanation. God does not love individual persons, but the world. His election does not abandon the human race to perdition, merely to save individuals, and to unite these as atoms to an aggregate under Christ; but He saves humanity, He redeems our race, and if all of our race are not saved, it is because they who are lost are cut off from the tree of humanity. There is no organism in hell, but an aggregate. In the realm of glory, on the other hand, there is no aggregate but the “body of Christ,” and hence an organic whole. This organic whole is no new “body,” but the original organism of humanity, as it was created under Adam as its central unity. Therefore the Scripture teaches that Christ is the second Adam, i.e. that Christ in His way now occupies the same place in the human race which was originally occupied by Adam. Hence it is not something else nor something new, but it is the original human race, it is humanity, which, reconciled and regenerated, is to accomplish the logical task of taking up subjectively into its consciousness this revealed ectypal Theology, and to reflect it from that consciousness. Whatever a man may be, as long as he does not share the life and thought of this regenerated humanity, he cannot share this task. “The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him: neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned” (1 Cor. ii. 14). Our consciousness is connected with our being. Without palingenesis there is no adaptation of our consciousness conceivable, which would enable it to assimilate or reflect ectypal Theology, and it is only by the “enlightening,” as the result of palingenesis, that our consciousness receives the susceptibility for this. As in the general subject of humanity the spirit of man (τό πνεύμα) is the real agent, so in the general subject of humanity, or in the body of Christ, the spirit (πνεύμα) in this body, i.e. the Holy Spirit, is the inner animator. And therefore the science of Theology is a task which must be accomplished, under the leading of the Holy Spirit, by regenerated humanity, and by those from among its ranks who, being partakers of palingenesis, and enriched by “enlightening,” have also in their natural disposition those special talents which are necessary for this intellectual task. That the science of Theology is thereby not isolated nor cut off from the common root of all science, can only be explained when we consider the [210] organism of Theology. Here we affirm that in every domain palingenesis revivifies the original man as “a creature of God,” and for no single moment abandons what was given in the nature of man. Sin tries to turn the excellencies of this nature into their opposites, but this fatal effect of sin has been restrained by common grace; and where particular grace renders this restraint potentially complete, and at the same time potentially recovers original purity, from the nature of the case the action of the Spirit in the sphere of palingenesis remains identical with the action of the Logos in human nature, and joins itself to the common grace, which has called all science into being, at every point of investigation.

pg 209-210, Abraham Kuyper, Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology

[46] "Scholasticism passed through three periods: the old, middle, and new. It begins with Anselm, who still operated in the naive confidence that faith could be elevated to the level of knowledge. For the existence of God, he attempts to demonstrate this in his Monologium; for the incarnation and atonement, in his Cur Deus Homo. He does not yet do this in the Aristotelian scholastic form but rather in the form of Plato's dialogues. Still, scholastic speculation starts with him. Lombard, in his Sentences (four books), did not , like Anselm, offer single treatises but a complete handbook on dogmatics and ethics." 

-- Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics: Prolegomena (Volume One), Chapter 4.46 Roman Catholic Dogmatics, page 146.

The short book contains many compelling arguments for Satisfaction. For instance, it requires a man to redeem men, so fallen angels are unable to be redeemed because God must necessarily to provide a sufficient atonement for angels in the same way that he had became a man to atone for men. Sins are explain in the terms of indebtedness and throughout Anselm's works he refers to evil as "non-being" or as "nothing." An evil doer is really someone who lacks good. So when a man sins, it is a debt that is owed to God, and the sinner must provide what is now lacking due to the debt, and this requires instant repayment of what is due. 

Anselm's works built upon each other, so to understand Cur Deus Homo the previous works should be read before hand (fortunately most are brief and available online for free: ccel link). Here are a couple selections that are interesting to this work:

Cur Deus Homo, Chapter XXI 
"How great a burden sin is."

Anselm. Suppose that you did not owe any of those things which you have brought up as possible payment for your sin, let us inquire whether they can satisfy for a sin so small as one look contrary to the will of God.
Boso. Did I not hear you question the thing, I should suppose that a single repentant feeling on my part would blot out this sin.
Anselm. You have not as yet estimated the great burden of sin.
Boso. Show it me then.
Anselm. If you should find yourself in the sight of God, and one said to you: “Look thither;” and God, on the other hand, should say: “It is not my will that you should look;” ask your own heart what there is in all existing things which would make it right for you to give that look contrary to the will of God.
Boso. I can find no motive which would make it right; unless, indeed I am so situated as to make it necessary for me either to do this, or some greater sin.
Anselm. Put away all such necessity, and ask with 229regard to this sin only whether you can do it even for your own salvation.
Boso. I see plainly that I cannot.
Anselm. Not to detain you too long; what if it were necessary either that the whole universe, except God himself, should perish and fall back into nothing, or else that you should do so small a thing against the will of God?
Boso. When I consider the action itself, it appears very slight; but when I view it as contrary to the will of God, I know of nothing so grievous, and of no loss that will compare with it; but sometimes we oppose another’s will without blame in order to preserve his property, so that afterwards he is glad that we opposed him.
Anselm. This is in the case of man, who often does not know what is useful for him, or cannot make up his loss; but God is in want of nothing, and, should all things perish, can restore them as easily as he created them.
Boso. I must confess that I ought not to oppose the will of God even to preserve the whole creation.
Anselm. What if there were more worlds as full of beings as this?
Boso. Were they increased to an infinite extent, and held before me in like manner, my reply would be the same.
Anselm. You cannot answer more correctly, but consider, also, should it happen that you gave the look contrary to God’s will, what payment you can make for this sin?
Boso. I can only repeat what I said before.
Anselm. So heinous is our sin whenever we knowingly oppose the will of God even in the slightest 230thing; since we are always in his sight, and he always enjoins it upon us not to sin.
Boso. I cannot deny it.
Anselm. Therefore you make no satisfaction unless you restore something greater than the amount of that obligation, which should restrain you from committing the sin.
Boso. Reason seems to demand this, and to make the contrary wholly impossible.
Anselm. Even God cannot raise to happiness any being bound at all by the debt of sin, because He ought not to.
Boso. This decision is most weighty.
Anselm. Listen to an additional reason which makes it no less difficult for man to be reconciled to God.
Boso. This alone would drive me to despair, were it not for the consolation of faith.
Anselm. But listen.
Boso. Say on

Abraham Kuyper by Theo van Doesburg (1910)

Abraham Kuyper's Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology: Its Principles is one of the best theology works I've read this year, and I'd like to feature a few selections from it. The following is a brief anecdote on Kuyper's views on "Common Sense." Common Sense was a pamphalete by Thomas Paine that was widely distributed and led to mass confusion over what is known intrinsically by man. Paine's work may be good to consider as you read the following selection:

"But if among your acquaintances you meet with but few persons who have this insight to such an extent as to entitle them to the epithet of “wise folk,” all the others are not fools; and yet only this antithetical conception of foolishness elucidates sufficiently the exact conception of wisdom. A fool and a lunatic are not the same. An insane man is he whose consciousness works in the wrong way, so that all normal insight has become impossible for him. A fool, on the other hand, is he whose consciousness works normally, but who himself stands so crookedly over against the reality of things, that he makes mistake upon mistake and constantly makes the wrong move on the chess-board of life. He acts foolishly who makes an evident mistake in his representation of reality, and who in consequence of his noticeable lack of accurate insight, chooses the very thing that will serve him a wrong end. He lacks the proper relation to the reality, and this accounts for his mistakes. Between these “wise folk” and these “fools” stands the great mass of humanity, who in all possible gradations form the transition from the wise to the foolish; while among these general masses is found what used to be called a sound mind, common sense, le sens commun. This But if among your acquaintances you meet with but few persons who have this insight to such an extent as to entitle them to the epithet of “wise folk,” all the others are not fools; and yet only this antithetical conception of foolishness elucidates sufficiently the exact conception of wisdom. A fool and a lunatic are not the same. An insane man is he whose consciousness works in the wrong way, so that all normal insight has become impossible for him. A fool, on the other hand, is he whose consciousness works normally, but who himself stands so crookedly over against the reality of things, that he makes mistake upon mistake and constantly makes the wrong move on the chess-board of life. He acts foolishly who makes an evident mistake in his representation of reality, and who in consequence of his noticeable lack of accurate insight, chooses the very thing that will serve him a wrong end. He lacks the proper relation to the reality, and this accounts for his mistakes. Between these “wise folk” and these “fools” stands the great mass of humanity, who in all possible gradations form the transition from the wise to the foolish; while among these general masses is found what used to be called a sound mind, common sense, le sens commun. This 86 implies something that does not scale the heights of wisdom, but which, nevertheless, maintains a relation to it and offers a general basis for it. We grant that, more especially since the close of the last century, this expression “common sense” has been used synonymously with that analogous “public opinion” in which the weakened form of Rationalism reflected itself, and that this spectre has repeatedly been evoked to banish idealism, to mock the faith, and to hush every nobler feeling; but this was simple abuse. Originally, “common sense” meant by no means the iteration of the program of a particular school, but, on the contrary, a certain accuracy of tact, by which, in utter disregard of the pretensions of the schools, public opinion followed a track which turned neither too far to the right nor to the left. This weakened wisdom, which generally directs the course of life, occasionally forsook public opinion, and this gave foolishness the upper hand, and mad counsels free courses; but, in the long run, common sense almost always gained the day. And in individual persons it is found, that if the particular “wise folk” be excluded, one class is inclined to foolishness, while another class remains subject to the influence of a weakened wisdom, and the latter are said to be the people of common sense; a term which does not so much express a personal gift (charisma), as the fact that they sail in safe channels. If the phenomenon itself be thus sufficiently established, the question arises, how, culminating in wisdom and finding its antithesis in folly, this phenomenon of “common sense” is to be psychologically interpreted. It is not the fruit of early training, it is not the result of study, neither is it the effect of constant practice. Though it is granted that these three factors facilitate and strengthen the clear operations of this common sense and of this wisdom, the phenomenon itself does not find its origin in them. Two young men, brought up in the same social circle, of like educational advantages and of similar experience, will differ widely in point of wisdom; one will become a wise man, while with the other life will be a constant struggle. Thus we have to do with a certain capacity of the human mind, which is not introduced into it from without, but which is present in that mind as such, and abides there. The Dutch language has the beautiful word “be-sef-fen” (to sense), which etymologically is connected with the root of sap-ientia, and indicates a certain immediate affinity to that which exists outside of us. In this sense prudence and wisdom are innate; not an innate conception, but an insight which proceeds immediately from the affinity in which by nature we stand to the world about us, and to the world of higher things. Both point to a condition in which, if we may so express it, man felt Nature’s pulse beat; in which he shared the life of every animate thing, and so perceived and understood it; and in which, moreover, he also apprehended the higher life not as something foreign to himself, but as “sensing” it in his own sense of existence. Or if we look ahead, both phenomena lie in the line, at whose end the seeing (θεωρείν) is reached, “the knowing as we are known.” 86 implies something that does not scale the heights of wisdom, but which, nevertheless, maintains a relation to it and offers a general basis for it. We grant that, more especially since the close of the last century, this expression “common sense” has been used synonymously with that analogous “public opinion” in which the weakened form of Rationalism reflected itself, and that this spectre has repeatedly been evoked to banish idealism, to mock the faith, and to hush every nobler feeling; but this was simple abuse. Originally, “common sense” meant by no means the iteration of the program of a particular school, but, on the contrary, a certain accuracy of tact, by which, in utter disregard of the pretensions of the schools, public opinion followed a track which turned neither too far to the right nor to the left. This weakened wisdom, which generally directs the course of life, occasionally forsook public opinion, and this gave foolishness the upper hand, and mad counsels free courses; but, in the long run, common sense almost always gained the day. And in individual persons it is found, that if the particular “wise folk” be excluded, one class is inclined to foolishness, while another class remains subject to the influence of a weakened wisdom, and the latter are said to be the people of common sense; a term which does not so much express a personal gift (charisma), as the fact that they sail in safe channels. If the phenomenon itself be thus sufficiently established, the question arises, how, culminating in wisdom and finding its antithesis in folly, this phenomenon of “common sense” is to be psychologically interpreted. It is not the fruit of early training, it is not the result of study, neither is it the effect of constant practice. Though it is granted that these three factors facilitate and strengthen the clear operations of this common sense and of this wisdom, the phenomenon itself does not find its origin in them. Two young men, brought up in the same social circle, of like educational advantages and of similar experience, will differ widely in point of wisdom; one will become a wise man, while with the other life will be a constant struggle. Thus we have to do with a certain capacity of the human mind, which is not introduced into it from without, but which is present in that mind as such, and abides there. The Dutch language has the beautiful word “be-sef-fen” (to sense), which etymologically is connected with the root of sap-ientia, and indicates a certain immediate affinity to that which exists outside of us. In this sense prudence and wisdom are innate; not an innate conception, but an insight which proceeds immediately from the affinity in which by nature we stand to the world about us, and to the world of higher things. Both point to a condition in which, if we may so express it, man felt Nature’s pulse beat; in which he shared the life of every animate thing, and so perceived and understood it; and in which, moreover, he also apprehended the higher life not as something foreign to himself, but as “sensing” it in his own sense of existence. Or if we look ahead, both phenomena lie in the line, at whose end the seeing (θεωρείν) is reached, “the knowing as we are known.” 87 The energy of this intuition is now broken. With some it seems entirely lost, and these are called “fools.” With some others it still works comparatively with great effect, for which reason they are called, preeminently, the wise folk. And between these extremes range the people of common sense; so called because in them something is still found of the old, sound, primitive force (Urkraft) of the human mind. Now it is readily seen what a formidable dam wisdom and common sense prove against the destructive floods of Skepticism. If there were no other way open to knowledge than that which discursive thought provides, the subjective character which is inseparable from all higher science, the uncertainty which is the penalty of sin, and the impossibility between truth and falsehood to decide what shall be objectively compulsory would encourage Skepticism to strike ever deeper root. But since an entirely different way of knowledge is disclosed to us by wisdom and its allied common sense, which, independent of scientific investigation, has a starting point of its own, this intuitive knowledge, founded on fixed perceptions given with our consciousness itself, offers a saving counterpoise to Skepticism. For now we have a certain insight, and on the ground of this insight a relative certainty, which has no connection with the discursive conflict between truth and falsehood, and which, being constantly confirmed in the fiery test of practical application in daily life, gives us a starting-point by which the conviction maintains itself in us that we are able to grasp the truth of things. And since this wisdom and common sense determine those very issues and principles of life, against which skepticism directs its most critical and important attacks, we find in this phenomenon, so mysterious in itself, a saving strength which enables the human mind to effect its escape from the clutches of Skepticism. This wisdom can never supersede discursive thought, nor can it take the place of empiricism, but it has the general universal tendency to exclude follies from the processes of discursive thought, and in empirical investigation to promote the accuracy of our tact. In answer to the objection that it is difficult to harmonize this interpretation of “wisdom” with the conception of σόφία in our word “philosophy” (φιλοσόφία), we observe that for a just criticism of this apparent objection we must go back to the original conception of “wisdom” as held by the Greeks, and to the most ancient meaning of the combination of φιλείν with this word. As for “wisdom,” we refer first of all to the noteworthy sentence of Heraclitus: σοφίη άληθέα λέγειν καί ποιείν κατά φύσιν έπαίοντας, i.e. “Wisdom consists in knowing how to speak the truth, and how to live according to nature,” in which the last words especially indicate that “wisdom” is taken as ripening from a natural instinct, while the verb “to live” (ποιείν) exhibits its practical character."

-- Abraham Kuyper, Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology, lulu edition. (pg85-87)

Comments...

I discovered that a concise collection of these refutations are available in one volume online, which I have copied here from this online volume at Calvin College:

CRITICISMS OF ANSELM'S ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR THE BEING OF GOD.

Mirror: http://www.ccel.org/ccel/anselm/basic_works.toc.html

DESCARTES

The Philosophy of Descartes in Extracts from His Writings. H. A. P. Torrey. New York, 1892. P. 161 et seq.

"But now, if from the simple fact that I can draw from my thought the idea of anything it follows that all that I recognise clearly and distinctly to pertain to this thing pertains to it in reality, can I not draw from this an argument and a demonstration of the existence of God? It is certain that I do not find in me the less the idea of him, that is, of a being supremely perfect, than that of any figure or of any number whatever; and I do not know less clearly and distinctly that an actual and eternal existence belongs to his nature than I know that all that I can demonstrate of any figure or of any number belongs truly to the nature of that figure or that number: and accordingly, although all that I have concluded in the preceding meditations may not turn out to be true, the existence of God ought to pass in my mind as being at least as certain as I have up to this time regarded the truths of mathematics to be, which have to do only with numbers and figures: although, indeed, that might not seem at first to be perfectly evident, but might appear to have some appearance of sophistry. For being accustomed in all other things to make a distinction between existence and essence, I easily persuade myself that existence may perhaps be separated from the essence of God, and thus God might be conceived as not existent actually. But nevertheless, when I think more attentively, I find that existence can no more be separated from the essence of God than from the essence of a rectilinear triangle can be separated the equality of its three angles to two right angles, or, indeed, if you please, from the idea of a mountain the idea of a valley; so that there would be no less contradiction in conceiving of a God--that is, of a being supremely perfect, to whom existence was wanting, that is to say, to whom there was wanting any perfection--than in conceiving of a mountain which had no valley. "But although, in reality, I might not be able to conceive of a God without existence, no more than of a mountain without a valley, nevertheless, as from the simple fact that I conceive a mountain with a valley, it does not follow that there exists any mountain in the world, so likewise, although I conceive God as existent, it does not follow, it seems, from that, that God exists, for my thought does not impose any necessity on things; and as there is nothing to prevent my imagining a winged horse, although there is none which has wings, so I might, perhaps, be able to attribute existence to God, although there might not be any God which existed. So far from this being so, it is just here under the appearance of this objection that a sophism lies hid; for from the fact that I cannot conceive a mountain without a valley, it does not follow that there exists in the world any mountain or any valley, but solely that the mountain and the valley, whether they exist or not, are inseparable from one another; whereas from the fact alone that I cannot conceive God except as existent, it follows that existence is inseparable from him, and, consequently, that he exists in reality; not that my thought can make it to be so, or that it can impose any necessity upon things; but on the contrary the necessity which is in the thing itself, that is to say, the necessity of the existence of God, determines me to have this thought. "For it is not at my will to conceive of a God without existence, that is to say, a being supremely perfect without a supreme perfection, as it is at my will to conceive a horse with wings or without wings. "And it must not also be said here that it is necessarily true that I should affirm that God exists, after I have supposed him to possess all kinds of perfection, since existence is one of these, but that my first supposition is not necessary, no more than it is necessary to affirm that all figures of four sides may be inscribed in the circle, but that, supposing I had this thought, I should be constrained to admit that the rhombus can be inscribed there, since it is a figure of four sides, and thus I should be constrained to admit something false. One ought not, I say, to allege this; for although it may not be necessary that I should ever fall to thinking about God, nevertheless, when it happens that I think upon a being first and supreme, and draw, so to speak, the idea of him from the store-house of mind, it is necessary that I attribute to him every sort of perfection, although I may not go on to enumerate them all, and give attention to each one in particular. And this necessity is sufficient to bring it about (as soon as I recognise that I should next conclude that existence is a perfection) that this first and supreme being exists: while, just as it is not necessary that I ever imagine a triangle, but whenever I choose to consider a rectilinear figure, composed solely of three angles, it is absolutely necessary that I attribute to it all the things which serve for the conclusion that there three angles are not greater than two right angles, although, perhaps, I did not then consider this in particular."

SPINOZA

The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza. Translated by R.H.M.Elwes. London, 1848. VoI. II., P. 51 et seq.

PROP. XI. God, or substance, consisting, of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists. "Proof.--If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that God does not exist: then his essence does not involve existence. But this (by Prop. vii.) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily exists. "Another Proof.--Of everything whatsoever a cause or reason must be assigned, either for its existence, or for its non-existence--e. g., if a triangle exist, a reason or cause must be granted for its existence; if, on the contrary, it does not exist, a cause must also be granted, which prevents it from existing, or annuls its existence. This reason or cause must either be contained in the nature of the thing in question, or be external to it. For instance, the reason for the non-existence of a square circle is indicated in its nature, namely, because it would involve a contradiction. On the other hand, the existence of substance follows also solely from its nature, inasmuch as its nature involves existence. (See Prop. vii.) "But the reason for the existence of a triangle or a circle does not follow from the nature of those figures, but from the order of universal nature in extension. From the latter it must follow, either that a triangle necessarily exists, or that it is impossible that it should exist. So much is self-evident. It follows therefrom that a thing necessarily exists, if no cause or reason be granted which prevents its existence. "If, then, no cause or reason can be given, which prevents the existence of God, or which destroys his existence, we must certainly conclude that he necessarily does exist. If such a reason or cause should be given, it must either be drawn from the very nature of God, or be external to him--that is, drawn from another substance of another nature. For if it were of the same nature, God, by that very fact, would be admitted to exist. But substance of another nature could have nothing in common with God (by Prop. ii.), and therefore would be unable either to cause or to destroy his existence. "As, then, a reason or cause which would annul the divine existence cannot be drawn from anything external to the divine nature, such cause must perforce, if God does not exist, be drawn from God's own nature, which would involve a contradiction. To make such an affirmation about a being absolutely infinite and supremely perfect, is absurd; therefore, neither in the nature of God, nor externally to his nature, can a cause or reason be assigned which would annul his existence. Therefore, God necessarily exists. Q. E. D. "Another proof.--The potentiality of non-existence is a negation of power, and contrariwise the potentiality of existence is a power, as is obvious. If, then, that which necessarily exists is nothing but finite beings, such finite beings are more powerful than a being absolutely infinite, which is obviously absurd; therefore, either nothing exists, or else a being absolutely infinite necessarily exists also. Now we exist either in ourselves, or in something else which necessarily exists (see Axiom i. and Prop. vii.). Therefore a being absolutely infinite--in other words, God (Def. vi.)--necessarily exists. Q. E. D. "Note.--In this last proof, I have purposely shown God's existence a posteriori, so that the proof might be more easily followed, not because, from the same premises, God's existence does not follow a priori. For, as the potentiality of existence is a power, it follows that, in proportion as reality increases in the nature of a thing, so also will it increase its strength for existence. Therefore a being absolutely infinite, such as God, has from himself an absolutely infinite power of existence, and hence he does absolutely exist. Perhaps there will be many who will be unable to see the force of this proof, inasmuch as they are accustomed only to consider those things which flow from external causes. Of such things, they see that those which quickly come to pass--that is, quickly come into existence--quickly also disappear; whereas they regard as more difficult of accomplishment--that is, not so easily brought into existence --those things which they conceive as more complicated. "However, to do away with this misconception, I need not here show the measure of truth in the proverb, What comes quickly, goes quickly,' nor discuss whether, from the point of view of universal nature, all things are equally easy, or otherwise: I need only remark, that I am not here speaking of things, which come to pass through causes external to themselves, but only of substances which (by Prop. vi.) cannot be produced by any external cause. Things which are produced by external causes, whether they consist of many parts or few, owe whatsoever perfection or reality they possess solely to the efficacy of their external cause, and therefore their existence arises solely from the perfection by their external cause, not from their own. Contrariwise, whatsoever perfection is possessed by substance is due to no external cause; wherefore the existence of substance must arise solely from its own nature, which is nothing else but its essence. Thus, the perfection of a thing does not annul its existence, but, on the contrary, asserts it. Imperfection, on the other hand, does annul it; therefore we cannot be more certain of the existence of anything, than of the existence of a being absolutely infinite or perfect--that is, of God. For inasmuch as his essence excludes all imperfection, and involves absolute perfection, all cause for doubt concerning his existence is done away, and the utmost certainty on the question is given. This, I think, will be evident to every moderately attentive reader."

LOCKE

An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. London: Ward, Lock, Co. P. 529 et seq.

"Our idea of a most perfect being, not the sole proof of a God.--How far the idea of a most perfect being which a man may frame in his mind, does or does not prove the existence of a God, I will not here examine. For, in the different make of men's tempers, and application of their thoughts, some arguments prevail more on one, and some on another, for the confirmation of the same truth. But yet, I think this I may say, that it is an ill way of establishing this truth and silencing atheists, to lay the whole stress of so important a point as this upon that sole foundation: and take some men's having that idea of God in their minds (for it is evident some men have none, and some worse than none, and the most very different) for the only proof of a Deity; and out of an over-fondness of that darling invention, cashier, or at least endeavor to invalidate, all other arguments, and forbid us to hearken to those proofs, as being weak or fallacious, which our own existence and the sensible parts of the universe offer so clearly and cogently to our thoughts, that I deem it impossible for a considering man to withstand them."

LEIBNITZ

New Essays Concerning Human Understanding. Translated by A.G. Langley. New York, 1896. P. 502 at seq.

"Although I am for innate ideas, and in particular for that of God, I do not think that the demonstrations of the Cartesians drawn from the idea of God are perfect. I have shown fully elsewhere (in the Actes de Leipsic, and in the Memoires de Trevoux) that what Descartes has borrowed from Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, is very beautiful and really very ingenious, but that there is still a gap therein to be filled. This celebrated archbishop, who was without doubt one of the most able men of his time, congratulates himself, not without reason, for having discovered a means of proving the existence of God a priori, by means of its own notion, without recurring to its effects. And this is very nearly the force of his argument: God is the greatest or (as Descartes says) the most perfect of beings, or rather a being of supreme grandeur and perfection, including all degrees thereof. That is the notion of God. See now how existence follows from this notion. To exist is something more than not to exist, or rather, existence adds a degree to grandeur and perfection, and as Descartes states it, existence is itself a perfection. Therefore this degree of grandeur and perfection, or rather this perfection which consists in existence, is in this supreme all-great, all-perfect being: for otherwise some degree would be wanting to it, contrary to its definition. Consequently this supreme being exists. The Scholastics, not excepting even their Doctor Angelicus, have misunderstood this argument, and have taken it as a paralogism; in which respect they were altogether wrong, and Descartes, who studied quite a long time the scholastic philosophy at the Jesuit College of La Fleche, had great reason for re-establishing it. It is not a paralogism, but it is an imperfect demonstration, which assumes something that must still be proved in order to render it mathematically evident; that is, it is tacitly assumed that this idea of the all-great or all-perfect being is possible, and implies no contradiction. And it is already something that by this remark it is proved that, assuming that God is Possible, he exists, which is the privilege of divinity alone. We have the right to presume the possibility of every being, and especially that of God, until some one proves the contrary. So that this metaphysical argument already gives a morally demonstrative conclusion, which declares that according to the present state of our knowledge we must judge that God exists, and act in conformity thereto. But it is to be desired, nevertheless, that clever men achieve the demonstration with the strictness of a mathematical proof, and I think I have elsewhere said something that may serve this end." 

KANT

Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by F. Max Muller. New York, 1896. P. 483 et seq.

"Being is evidently not a real predicate, or a concept of something that can be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the admission of a thing, and of certain determinations in it. Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgment. The proposition, God is almighty, contains two concepts, each having its object, namely, God and almightiness. The small word is, is not an additional predicate, but only serves to put the predicate in relation to the subject. If, then, I take the subject (God) with all its predicates (including that of almightiness), and say, God is, or there is a God, I do not put a new predicate to the concept of God, but I only put the subject by itself, with all its predicates, in relation to my concept, as its object. Both must contain exactly the same kind of thing, and nothing can have been added to the concept, which expresses possibility only, by my thinking its object as simply, given and saying, it is. And thus the real does not contain more than the possible. A hundred real dollars do not contain a penny more than a hundred possible dollars. For as the latter signify the concept, the former the object and its position by itself, it is clear that, in case the former contained more than the latter, my concept would not express the whole object, and would not therefore be its adequate concept. In my financial position no doubt there exists more by one hundred real dollars, than by their concept only (that is their possibility), because in reality the object is not only contained analytically in my concept, but is added to my concept (which is a determination of my state), synthetically: but the conceived hundred dollars are not in the least increased through the existence which is outside my concept. "By whatever and by however many predicates I may think a thing (even in completely determining it), nothing is really added to it, if I add that the thing exists. Otherwise, it would not be the same that exists, but something more than was contained in the concept, and I could not say that the exact object of my concept existed. Nay, even if I were to think in a thing all reality, except one, that one missing reality would not be supplied by my saying that so defective a thing exists, but it would exist with the same defect with which I thought it; or what exists would be different from what I thought. If, then, I try to conceive a being, as the highest reality (without any defect), the question still remains, whether it exists or not. For though in my concept there may be wanting nothing of the possible real content of a thing in general, something is wanting in its relation to my whole state of thinking, namely, that the knowledge of that object should be possible a posteriori also. And here we perceive the cause of our difficulty. If we were concerned with an object of our senses, I could not mistake the existence of a thing for the mere concept of it; for by the concept the object is thought as only in harmony with the general conditions of a possible empirical knowledge, while by its existence it is thought as contained in the whole content of experience. Through this connection with the content of the whole experience, the concept of an object is not in the least increased; our thought has only received through it one more possible perception. If, however, we are thinking existence through the pure category alone, we need not wonder that we cannot find any characteristic to distinguish it from mere possibility. "Whatever, therefore, our concept of an object may contain, we must always step outside it, in order to attribute to it existence. With objects of the senses, this takes place through their connection with any one of my perceptions, according to empirical laws; with objects of pure thought, however, there is no means of knowing their existence, because it would have to be known entirely a priori, while our consciousness of every kind of existence, whether immediately by perception, or by conclusions which connect something with perception, belongs entirely to the unity of experience, and any existence outside that field, though it cannot be declared to be absolutely impossible, is a presupposition that cannot be justified by anything. "The concept of a Supreme Being is, in many respects, a very useful idea, but, being an idea only, it is quite incapable of increasing, by itself alone, our knowledge with regard to what exists. It cannot even do so much as to inform us any further as to its possibility. The analytical characteristic of possibility, which consists in the absence of contradiction in mere positions (realities), cannot be denied to it; but the connection of all real properties in one and the same thing is a synthesis the possibility of which we cannot judge a priori because these realities are not given to us as such, and because, even if this were so, no judgment whatever takes place, it being necessary to look for the characteristic of the possibility of synthetical knowledge in experience only, to which the object of an idea can never belong. Thus we see that the celebrated Leibnitz is far from having achieved what we thought he had, namely, to understand a priori the possibility of so sublime an ideal Being. "Time and labor therefore are lost on the famous ontological (Cartesian) proof of the existence of a Supreme Being from mere concepts; and a man might as well imagine that he could become richer in knowledge by mere ideas, as a merchant in capital, if, in order to improve his position, he were to add a few noughts to his cash account."

HEGEL

Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Translated by E. S. Haldane and F.H. Simson. London, 1896. Vol. III., p. 62 et seg.

"This proof was included among the various proofs up to the time of Kant, and--by some who have not yet reached the Kantian standpoint--it is so included even to the present day. It is different from what we find and read of amongst the ancients. For it was said that God is absolute thought as objective; for because things in the world are contingent, they are not the truth in and for itself--but this is found in the infinite. The scholastics also knew well from the Aristotelian philosophy the metaphysical proposition that potentiality is nothing by itself, but is clearly one with actuality. Later, on the other hand, the opposition between thought itself and Being began to appear with Anselm. It is noteworthy that only now for the first time through the Middle Ages and in Christianity, the universal Notion and Being, as it is to ordinary conception, became established in this pure abstraction as these infinite extremes; and thus the highest law has come to consciousness. But we reach our profoundest depths in bringing the highest opposition into consciousness. Only no advance was made beyond the division as such, although Anselm also tried to find the connection between the sides. But while hitherto God appeared as the absolute existent, and the universal was attributed to Him as predicate, an opposite order begins with Anselm--Being becomes predicate, and the absolute Idea is first of all established as the subject, but the subject of thought. Thus if the existence of God is once abandoned as the first hypothesis, and established as a result of thought, self-consciousness is on the way to turn back within itself. Then we have the question coming in, Does God exist? while on the other side the question of most importance was, What is God? "The ontological proof, which is the first properly metaphysical proof of the existence of God, consequently came to mean that God as the Idea of existence which unites all reality in itself, also has the reality of existence within Himself; this proof thus follows from the Notion of God, that He is the universal essence of all essence. The drift of this reasoning is, according to Anselm (Proslogium, C. 2), as follows: It is one thing to say that a thing is in the understanding, and quite another to perceive that it exists. Even an ignorant person (insipiens) will thus be quite convinced that in thought there is something beyond which nothing greater can be thought ; for when he hears this he understands it, and everything that is understood is in the understanding. But that beyond which nothing greater can be thought cannot certainly be in the understanding alone. For if it is accepted as in thought alone, we may go on farther to accept it as existent; that, however, is something greater' than what is merely thought. Thus were that beyond which nothing greater can be thought merely in the understanding, that beyond which nothing greater can be thought would be something beyond which something greater can be thought. But that is truly impossible; there thus without doubt exists both in the understanding and in reality something beyond which nothing greater can be thought.' The highest conception cannot be in the understanding alone; it is essential that it should exist. Thus it is made clear that Being is in a superficial way subsumed under the universal of reality, that to this extent Being does not enter into opposition with the Notion. That is quite right; only the transition is not demonstrated--that the subjective understanding abrogates itself. This, however, is just the question which gives the whole interest to the matter. When reality or completion is expressed in such a way that it is not yet posited as existent, it is something thought, and rather opposed to Being than that this is subsumed under it. "This mode of arguing held good until the time of Kant; and we see in it the endeavor to apprehend the doctrine of the Church through reason. This opposition between Being and thought is the starting-point in philosophy, the absolute that contains the two opposites within itself--a conception, according to Spinoza, which involves its existence likewise. Of Anselm it is however to be remarked that the formal logical mode of the understanding, the process of scholastic reasoning is to be found in him; the content indeed is right, but the form faulty. For in the first place the expression the thought of a Highest' is assumed as prius. Secondly, there are two sorts of objects of thought--one that is and another that is not; the object that is only thought and does not exist, is as imperfect as that which only is without being thought. The third point is that what is highest must likewise exist. But what is highest, the standard to which all else must conform, must be no mere hypothesis, as we find it represented in the conception of a highest acme of perfection, as a content which is thought and likewise is. This very content, the unity of Being and thought, is thus indeed the true content, but because Anselm has it before him only in the form of the understanding, the opposites are identical and conformable to unity in a third determination only--the Highest--which, in as far as it is regulative, is outside of them. In this it is involved that we should first of all have subjective thought, and then distinguished from that, Being. We allow that if we think a content (and it is apparently indifferent whether this is God or any other), it may be the case that this content does not exist. The assertion Something that is thought does not exist' is now subsumed under the above standard and is not conformable to it. We grant that the truth is that which is not merely thought but which likewise is. But of this opposition nothing here is said. Undoubtedly God would be imperfect, if He were merely thought and did not also have the determination of Being. But in relation to God we must not take thought as merely subjective; thought here signifies the absolute, pure thought, and thus we must ascribe to Him the quality of Being. On the other hand if God were merely Being, if He were not conscious of Himself as self-consciousness, He would not be Spirit, a thought that thinks itself. "Kant, on the other hand, attacked and rejected Anselm's proof--which rejection the whole world afterwards followed up--on the ground of its being an assumption that the unity of Being and thought is the highest perfection. What Kant thus demonstrates in the present day--that Being is different from thought and that Being is not by any means posited with thought--was a criticism offered even in that time by a monk named Gaunilo. He combated this proof of Anselm's in a Liber pro insipiente to which Anselm himself directed a reply in his Liber apologeticus adversus insipientem. Thus Kant says (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, P. 464 of the sixth edition): If we think a hundred dollars, this conception does not involve existence. That is certainly true: what is only a conception does not exist, but it is likewise not a true content, for what does not exist, is merely an untrue conception. Of such we do not however here speak, but of pure thought; it is nothing new to say they are different--Anselm knew this just as well as we do. God is the infinite, just as body and soul, Being and thought are eternally united; this is the speculative, true definition of God. To the proof which Kant criticises in a manner which it is the fashion to follow now-a-days, there is thus lacking only the perception of the unity of thought and of existence in the infinite; and this alone must form the commencement."

J. A. DORNER

A System of Christian Doctrine. Translated by A. Cave and J. S. Banks, Edinburgh, 1880. Vol. I., p. 216 et seq 

"According to the Monologium, we arrive at the mental representation of God by the agency of faith and conscience, therefore by a combined religious and moral method; by the same means we arrive at the representation of the relativity of the world. But as there seemed to Anselm something inadequate in making the Being of the Absolute dependent upon the existence of the Relative, as if the latter were more certain than the former, he has interpolated in the Proslogium (Alloquium Dei) the Ontological method. The thought of God, which is always given, and the being of which is to be proved, claims, at any rate, to be the highest thought possible; indeed, upon close comparison with all other thoughts which come and go, with thoughts of such things as may just as well not exist as exist, it has the essential peculiarity, the prerogative, so to speak,--and this is Anselm's discovery,--that, if it is actually thought of as the highest conceivable thought, it is also thought of as existent. Were it not thought of as being, it would not for a moment be actually thought. Anselm then proceeds with his proof as follows: We believe Thou art something, beyond which nothing greater can be thought. The fool (Ps. xiv.) denies the existence of such a Being. Is He therefore non-existent? But the very fool hears and understands what I say, "something, greater than which there is nothing," and what he understands is in his understanding. That it also exists without him would thus have to be proved. But that, beyond which nothing greater can be thought, cannot exist in mere intellect. For did it exist only in intellect, the thought might be framed that it was realised, and that would be a greater thought. Consequently, were that, a greater than which cannot be thought, existent in mere intellect, the thought quo majus cogitari non potest would at the same time be quo majus cogitari potest, which is impossible. Consequently, there exists, in reality as well as in the understanding, something a greater than which cannot be thought. And this is so true that its non-existence cannot be thought. Something may be thought which is only to be thought as existent, and that is a majus than that the non-existence of which may be thought, and that Thou art, O Lord, my God, I must think though I did not believe.' The nerve of the Anselmic argument lies therefore in the notion that an idea which has an objective existence is a majus than that to which mere subjective existence appertains; that, consequently, as under the idea of God the highest thought possible is at any rate expressed, the idea of God is not thought unless it is thought as existent. For, he says in another place, it may be thought of everything that it does not exist, with the exception of that quod summe est to which being pre-eminently belongs. That is, the non-existence may be thought of everything which has beginning or end, or which is constituted of parts and is nowhere whole. But that, and it alone, cannot be thought as non-existent which has neither beginning nor end, and is not constituted of parts, but is thought of as everywhere existing whole. Gaunilo, Count of Montigny, makes a twofold answer in defence of the atheist. He says that that highest essence has no being in the understanding; it only exists therein by the ear, not by being; it only exists as a man who has heard a sound endeavors to embrace a thing wholly unknown to him in an image. And therein, he says, it is concluded that the mental representation of God in mankind is already a purely contingent one, and is produced from without by the sound of words; its necessary presence in the spirit is not proved. Thus, he adds, much is wanting to the ability of inferring its existence from the finding of such an image in the spirit. In the sphere of mere imagination no one thing has a less or a greater existence than any other thing; each has equally no existence at all. Therefore, he writes, granted that the presence of the idea of God in the spirit is not contingent, still the thought or the concept of God does not essentially argue the being of God. Similarly says Kant later on: We are no richer if we think of our ability as one cipher more.' That Anselm also undoubtedly knew, but he opined that the concept of God is different to any other thought, which remains unaltered, whether it is thought of as existent or non-existent; the concept of God is that thought, which is no longer thought unless it is thought as existent, and which, therefore, essentially involves being. But, of course, it is insufficiently established by Anselm that a concept of God which does not necessarily include existence, is not the highest thought, and therefore is not the concept of God, and that, consequently, the really highest thought must also be thought of as existent. To this the following objection attaches. Inasmuch as Anselm treated existence as a majus compared with non-existence, he treated existence as an attribute, whereas it is the bearer of all attributes. So it is not proved by Anselm that the origin of this idea, which, when thought, is thought as existent, is not contingent to the reason, but necessary; and that reason only remains reason by virtue of this idea. Finally, Anselm thinks, thus overrating the Ontological moment, that he has already attained therein the full concept of God. These shortcomings were to be obviated, stage by stage, by his successors."

LOTZE

Microcosmus. Translated by E. Hamilton and E. E. C. Jones. Edinburgh, 1887. Vol. II., p. 669 et seq. 

"To conclude that because the notion of a most perfect Being includes reality as one of its perfections, therefore a most perfect Being necessarily exists, is so obviously to conclude falsely, that after Kant's incisive refutation any attempt to defend such reasoning would be useless. Anselm, in his more free and spontaneous reflection, has here and there touched the thought that the greatest which we can think, if we think it as only thought, is less than the same greatest if we think it as existent. It is not possible that from this reflection either any one should develop a logically cogent proof, but the way in which it is put seems to reveal another fundamental thought which is seeking for expression. For what would it matter if that which is thought as most perfect were, as thought, less than the least reality? Why should this thought disturb us? Plainly for this reason, that it is an immediate certainty that what is greatest, most beautiful, most worthy is not a mere thought, but must be a reality, because it would be intolerable to believe of our ideal that it is an idea produced by the action of thought but having no existence, no power, and no validity in the world of reality. We do not from the perfection of that which is perfect immediately deduce its reality as a logical consequence; but without the circumlocution of a deduction we directly feel the impossibility of its non-existence, and all semblance of syllogistic proof only serves to make more clear the directness of this certainty. If what is greatest did not exist, then what is greatest would not be, and it is not impossible that that which is greatest of all conceivable things should not be."

PROFESSOR ROBERT FLINT

Theism. New York, 1893. Seventh edition. P. 278 et seq. 

"Anselm was the founder of that kind of argumentation which, in the opinion of many, is alone entitled to be described as a priori or ontological. He reasoned thus: The fool may say in his heart, There is no God; but he only proves thereby that he is a fool, for what he says is self-contradictory. Since he denies that there is a God, he has in his mind the idea of God, and that idea implies the existence of God, for it is the idea of a Being than which a higher cannot be conceived. That than which a higher cannot be conceived cannot exist merely as an idea, because what exists merely as an idea is inferior to what exists in reality as well as in idea. The idea of a highest Being which exists merely in thought, is the idea of a highest Being which is not the highest even in thought, but inferior to a highest Being which exists in fact as well as in thought.' This reasoning found unfavorable critics even among the contemporaries of Anselm, and has commended itself completely to few. Yet it may fairly be doubted whether it has been conclusively refuted, and some of the objections most frequently urged against it are certainly inadmissible. It is no answer to it, for example, to deny that the idea of God is innate or universal. The argument merely assumes that he who denies that there is a God must have an idea of God. There is also no force, as Anselm showed, in the objection of Gaunilo, that the existence of God can no more be inferred from the idea of a perfect being, than the existence of a perfect island is to be inferred from the idea of such an island. There neither is nor can be an idea of an island which is greater and better than any other that can ever be conceived. Anselm could safely promise that he would make Gaunilo a present of such an island when he had really imagined it. Only one being--an infinite, independent, necessary being--can be perfect in the sense of being greater and better than every other conceivable being. The objection that the ideal can never logically yield the real--that the transition from thought to fact must be in every instance illegitimate--is merely an assertion that the argument is fallacious. It is an assertion which cannot fairly be made until the argument has been exposed and refuted. The argument is that a certain thought of God is found necessarily to imply His existence. The objection that existence is not a predicate, and that the idea of a God who exists is not more complete and perfect than the idea of a God who does not exist, is, perhaps, not incapable of being satisfactorily repelled. Mere existence is not a predicate, but specifications or determinations of existence are predicable. Now the argument nowhere implies that existence is a predicate; it implies only that reality, necessity, and independence of existence are predicates of existence; and it implies this on the ground that existence in re can be distinguished from existence in conceptu, necessary from contingent existence, self-existence from derived existence. Specific distinctions must surely admit of being predicated. That the exclusion of existence--which here means real and necessary existence --from the idea of God does not leave us with an incomplete idea of God, is not a position, I think, which can be maintained. Take away existence from among the elements in the idea of a perfect being, and the idea becomes either the idea of a nonentity or the idea of an idea, and not the idea of a perfect being at all. Thus, the argument of Anselm is unwarrantably represented as an argument of four terms instead of three. Those who urge the objection seem to me to prove only that if our thought of God be imperfect, a being who merely realised that thought would be an imperfect being; but there is a vast distance between this truism and the paradox that an unreal being may be an ideally perfect being."

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Patrologioe Cursus Completus. Series Secunda. Tomi CLVIIICLIX. S. Anselmus. [Ed. ABBE MIGNE]. Paris, 1853. CHURCH. A. W. St. Anselm. [Third Edition]. London, 1873 FRANCK, G F. Anselm von Canterbury. Tubingen, 1842. HASSE, F. R. Anselm von Canterbury. Leipzig, 1843. 2 volumes. -The same. Translated and abridged by W.Turner. London, 1850. REMUSAT, CHARLES DE. Anselme de Canterbury. Paris, 1854; 2nd ed., 1868. RIGG, J. M. St. Anselm of Canterbury. London, 1896. RULE M. The Ltfe and Times of St. Anselm. London, 1883. 2 volumes. DE VOSGES, LE COMTE DOMET. Saint Anselme, in the series Les Grands Philosophes. Paris, 1901. WELCH, A. C. Anselm and His Work. Edinburgh, 1901. BAUR, F. C. Vorlesungen uber die christliche Dogmengeschichte. Leipzig, 1866. Zweiter Band, 249-251, 298 ff. ERDMANN, J. E. A History of Philosophy. English Translation [Ed. W. S. HOUGH]. London, 1891. Vol I., 303-314. HEGEL, G. W. F. Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Translated from the German by E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson. London, 1896. Vol. III., 61-67. HOOK, W. T. Lives of the Archbishops of Canterbury. London, 1862. Vol. VIII., 169-276. MAURICE, F.D. Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy. London, 1882. Vol. I., 507-533. PFLEIDERER, 0. The Philosophy of Religion. Translated by A. Menzies. London, 1888. Vol. III., 271-276. UEBERWEG, F.^1 History of Philosophy. Translated by G. S. Morris. New York, 1892. Vol. I., 377-386. ^1 Ueberweg gives the titles of German and Latin dissertations on Anselm not included in this list.

I'm reading through Oxford World Classic's book: Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works. After a short biography of Anselm, is Anselm's first major work: Monologium (online text). Monologium reads as Philosophy book with many Aristotelian Syllogisms. Monologium introduces Anselm's Ontological Argument (which is presented in its fullness in his subsequent Proslogium.)

Anselm's use of Antithesis is what makes his arguments so persuasive. The following is an example from Monologium where Anselm discusses the three ways that the following statement could be interpreted: "How it is to be understood that this Nature created all things from nothing?" 

What, then, is to be our understanding of the term nothing?—For I have already determined not to neglect in this meditation any possible objection, even if it be almost foolish.—In three ways, then—and this suffices for the removal of the present obstacle—can the statement that any substance was created from nothing be explained.

There is one way, according to which we wish it to be understood, that what is said to have been created from nothing has not been created at all; just [54] as, to one who asks regarding a dumb man, of what he speaks, the answer is given, “of nothing,” that is, he does not speak at all. According to this interpretation, to one who enquires regarding the supreme Being, or regarding what never has existed and does not exist at all, as to whence it was created, the answer, “from nothing” may properly be given; that is, it never was created. But this answer is unintelligible in the case of any of those things that actually were created.

There is another interpretation which is, indeed, capable of supposition, but cannot be true; namely, that if anything is said to have been created from nothing, it was created from nothing itself (de nihilo ipso), that is, from what does not exist at all, as if this very nothing were some existent being, from which something could be created. But, since this is always false, as often as it is assumed an irreconcilable contradiction follows.

There is a third interpretation, according to which a thing is said to have been created from nothing, when we understand that it was indeed created, but that there is not anything whence it was created. Apparently it is said with a like meaning, when a man is afflicted without cause, that he is afflicted “over nothing.”

-- Anselm, Monologium Chapter VIII 

The Ontological Argument

The word "Ontological" is derived from the Latin words "Ont" and "Logia" that mean the reason of being or the logic of being. Although the Ontological Argument is most clearly defined in Proslogium, there are three works by Anselm that should be read together to fully understand the Ontological Argument and Anselm's answers to objections: Monologium, Proslogium, and Reply to Gaunilo. The last work, Reply to Gaunilo, answers objections raised to the Ontological Argument in a short letter titled Pro Insipiente (On behalf of the Fool) by Gaunilo of Marmoutiers. 

The Ontological Argument is as Anselm wrote "we believe that thou art a being than which nothing greater can be conceived." Or in other words that there is a being which is greater than all beings, or rather there necessarily is a being in which nothing greater could be conceived, and the argument is even extended that there must be a being greater than what may be conceived. So therefore this being must be God. Here is the argument is Anselm's own words:

Ontological Argument in Proslogium:

CHAPTER II. Truly there is a God, although the fool hath said in his heart, There is no God.

AND so, Lord, do thou, who dost give understanding to faith, give me, so far as thou knowest it to be profitable, to understand that thou art as we believe; and that thou art that which we believe. And indeed, we believe that thou art a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. Or is there no such nature, since the fool hath said in his heart, there is no God? (Psalms xiv. 1). But, at any rate, this very fool, when he hears of this being of which I speak—a being than which nothing greater can be conceived—understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding; although he does not understand it to exist.

For, it is one thing for an object to be in the understanding, and another to understand that the object exists. When a painter first conceives of what he will afterwards perform, he has it in his understanding, but he does not yet understand it to be, because he has not yet performed it. But after he has made the painting, he both has it in his understanding, and he understands that it exists, because he has made it. [8] Hence, even the fool is convinced that something exists in the understanding, at least, than which nothing greater can be conceived. For, when he hears of this, he understands it. And whatever is understood, exists in the understanding. And assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone. For, suppose it exists in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater.

Therefore, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one, than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality.

CHAPTER III. God cannot be conceived not to exist.—God is that, than which nothing greater can be conceived.—That which can be conceived not to exist is not God.

AND it assuredly exists so truly, that it cannot be conceived not to exist. For, it is possible to conceive of a being which cannot be conceived not to exist; and this is greater than one which can be conceived not to exist. Hence, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, it is not that, than which nothing greater can be conceived. But this is an irreconcilable contradiction. There is, then, so truly a being than which nothing greater can be conceived to exist, that it cannot even [9] be conceived not to exist; and this being thou art, O Lord, our God.

So truly, therefore, dost thou exist, O Lord, my God, that thou canst not be conceived not to exist; and rightly. For, if a mind could conceive of a being better than thee, the creature would rise above the Creator; and this is most absurd. And, indeed, whatever else there is, except thee alone, can be conceived not to exist. To thee alone, therefore, it belongs to exist more truly than all other beings, and hence in a higher degree than all others. For, whatever else exists does not exist so truly, and hence in a less degree it belongs to it to exist. Why, then, has the fool said in his heart, there is no God (Psalms xiv. 1), since it is so evident, to a rational mind, that thou dost exist in the highest degree of all? Why, except that he is dull and a fool?

-- Anselm, Proslogium, Chapters II-III

Reply to Gaunilo's Lost Island counterexample to the Ontological Argument

In Anselm's Reply to Gaunilo, he answers many objections to the Ontological Argument that helps clarify what was already said in the Monlogium and Proslogium. This work contains an analogy to a "Lost Island" that is a utopia, greater than all other islands, and it has perfect fertility, etc. And Gaunilo used this Lost Island as a greatest island of which may though but considered it a counter argument because it may not exist and he had a right to doubt its existence. Anselm, via Anthesis explains that the Lost Island is not a necessary being, because it could not exist and yet all other islands may still exist. The greatest being in the Ontological Argument is a necessary being, where the Lost Island is not a necessary being. 

Reply to Gaunilo, CHAPTER III. A criticism of Gaunilon’s example, in which he tries to show that in this way the real existence of a lost island might be inferred from the fact of its being conceived. 

BUT, you say, it is as if one should suppose an island in the ocean, which surpasses all lands in its fertility, and which, because of the difficulty, or the impossibility, of discovering what does not exist, is called a lost island; and should say that there can no doubt that this island truly exists in reality, for this reason, that one who hears it described easily understands what he hears.

Now I promise confidently that if any man shall devise anything existing either in reality or in concept alone (except that than which a greater be conceived) to which he can adapt the sequence of my reasoning, I will discover that thing, and will give him his lost island, not to be lost again.

But it now appears that this being than which a greater is inconceivable cannot be conceived not to [159] be, because it exists on so assured a ground of truth; for otherwise it would not exist at all.

Hence, if any one says that he conceives this being not to exist, I say that at the time when he conceives of this either he conceives of a being than which a greater is inconceivable, or he does not conceive at all. If he does not conceive, he does not conceive of the non-existence of that of which he does not conceive. But if he does conceive, he certainly conceives of a being which cannot be even conceived not to exist. For if it could be conceived not to exist, it could be conceived to have a beginning and an end. But this is impossible.

He, then, who conceives of this being conceives of a being which cannot be even conceived not to exist; but he who conceives of this being does not conceive that it does not exist; else he conceives what is inconceivable. The non-existence, then, of that than which a greater cannot be conceived is inconceivable.

-- Anselm, Reply to Gaunilo, Chapter III.

Jonathan Edward's Unpublished Essay on the Trinity verses Anselm's Monologium

The Monologium is strikingly similar to Jonathan Edward's Discourse on the Trinity (mirror) (also known as Edward's "Unpublished Essay on the Trinity) that's in Yale's Vol 21 of WJE Online Words of Edwards. The Monologium is a proof for the Trinity based on the concepts underlying the Ontological Argument. After discussing the Greatest Being, then he consider that's being's Wisdom as the begotten Son, and that the Holy Spirit is breated-out (spirated) and not begotten from the unbegotten and begotten deities to form one being in three persons. At the very end he puts the names Father, Son and Holy Spirit on to each of the three descriptions.

Anselm defines a being that which is the greatest of what may be thought, and then considers that being. The Monologium uses concepts similar to Plato's forms or Aristotle's Categories to discuss the perfection of Wisdom and Justice. Anselm proves God's Simplicity by stating that God will be the sum of all attributes in their greatest form that will result in a being without division. He also discusses since all things are derived from God then God is everywhere, because otherwise there would be an existing being that is not derived from God. So therefore God is all places, and he also shows that God is at all times, and consequently God could not be at one particular place because that would mean there would be other places where God was not. This is why God's nature must necessarily be different than created nature. 

Edward's uses Lockean Idealism to do the same thing, starting with God's idea of Himself, and then the Love of that Idea. I found that the Monologium is supported in the same way through the nature of greatest being. Edwards uses copious scriptures to support his proof where Anselm does not provide scriptures or quotations from theologians. Anselm's argument for Simplicity adds something lacking from Edwards, because without closely thinking, Edward's essay at first could produce a pantheon of God via infinite recursion of God's Idea of the Idea of the Idea of Himself, ad infinitum, whereas the recursion in Anselm points to God's Simplicity and to a Perfection of Being, and would in Edwards case yield a perfection of Idealism.  This is certainly not lacking from Edwards, but Anselm has made it clearer to me.

Last Thoughts

Anselm's Ontological Argument stood unopposed until Immanuel Kant's objections almost a thousand years later, and in fact it is still a very strong argument today (with many modified forms).